Personal Value in the Analysis of Rights
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Resumo
Este estudo faz uma análise parcial do conceito de direito-pretensão, em resposta a algumas versões das tradicionais teorias do interesse e da vontade. Tenta mostrar-se que o conceito de valor pessoal é menos denso do que os de interesse e de vontade, devendo, também por isso, tomar o seu lugar nas teorias do direito subjetivo. Um estado de coisas tem valor pessoal (positivo) se e só se há razões para promover (ou, mais amplamente, «favorecer») esse estado de coisas em atenção a, por mor de ou, neste sentido, por causa de certa pessoa ou de certa entidade semelhante a uma pessoa. Quando o interesse ou a vontade de uma pessoa é uma razão para promover o seu conteúdo, isso é, nos casos mais comuns, uma razão para promover esse conteúdo por mor dessa pessoa, e o estado de coisas respetivo tem, portanto, valor pessoal. Usar o conceito de valor pessoal em lugar dos de interesse e de vontade condiz com importantes pressupostos morais e jurídicos, embora não implique nenhum deles. Os capítulos finais deste artigo defendem um conceito de valor pessoal e, portanto, de direito subjetivo compatível com a possibilidade de entidades não valiosas, como certas empresas ou alguns autómatos terem direitos subjetivos.
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